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 The Emerging Law of Electronic Commerce
 By Amelia H. Boss and Jane Kaufman Winn*
 The emergence of the Internet as a mass-media phenomenon with a
 growing number of commercial uses has brought the subject of electronic
 commerce to the attention of a wide audience for the first time.1 While
 the current popularity of Internet electronic commerce may or may not
 be sustainable, electronic commerce is here to stay.2 The overall benefits
 accruing to businesses from the increased speed and efficiency of electronic
 technologies, as well as the ability to communicate virtually instantane-
 ously with trading partners throughout the world, has made electronic
 commerce indispensable in today's marketplace. Indeed, the use of elec-
 tronic technologies already has had three major effects on commercial
 relationships: (i) commercial parties have begun to restructure their busi-
 ness practices using such technologies to communicate internally as well
 as externally; (ii) new industries have emerged to provide needed services
 to companies engaging in electronic commerce; and (iii) new types of prop-
 erty with commercial value have become the subject of trade domestically
 and internationally.3
 As the world of electronic commerce expands, there is an increasing
 ♦Ms. Boss is a professor of law at Temple University School of Law, Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
 vania. Professor Boss, a former chair of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the
 Section of Business Law, serves as a member of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uni-
 form Commercial Code and as a member of the drafting committees for Articles 1,2, and
 2B. She also serves as the United States delegate to the United Nations Commission on
 International Trade Law and its Working Group on Electronic Commerce.
 Ms. Winn is an associate professor at Southern Methodist University School of Law,
 Dallas, Texas. Professor Winn is co-author, with Benjamin Wright, of The Law of Elec-
 tronic Commerce, 3rd ed. (forthcoming 1997).
 1 . A good source for current information regarding cyberspace legal issues is the website
 of the Committee on the Law of Commerce in Cyberspace, ABA Section of Business Law
 (visited July 24, 1997) <http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/cyber/>.
 2. Although it is impossible to foresee all the implications electronic technologies may
 have for the political, cultural, and business climates of the future, some, nonetheless, have
 tried. See generally Marshall McLuhan & Bruce R. Powers, The Global Village:
 Transformations in World Life and Media in the Twenty-First Century (1989).
 3. See generally Amelia H. Boss, The Emerging Law of International Electronic Commerce^ 6 Temple
 Int'l & Comp. LJ. 293 (1992).
 1469
This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 18:39:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1470 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 52, August 1997
 demand for clarity in the rules which apply to the participants and their
 transactions. Uncertainty exists on such matters as whether agreements
 entered into electronically are enforceable, how the operative terms of
 online contracts will be determined by courts, what rights parties have to
 online information, and what electronic self-help remedies they may ex-
 ercise. The increased costs of dealing with these new legal uncertainties
 may offset any reduction in costs achieved through the use of new tech-
 nologies and, as a result, may slow needlessly the rate at which businesses
 are willing to implement new technologies.
 It is imperative that the law remain current with technological and
 commercial developments and establish a stable, uniform framework of
 rules that will provide the needed certainty and predictability for com-
 merce. The need for such a framework has been emphasized in a White
 House paper calling for a "Uniform Commercial Code" for cyberspace:
 a "domestic and global uniform commercial legal framework that recog-
 nizes, facilitates, and enforces electronic commercial transactions world-
 wide."4 Legislatures throughout the country hear demands for legislation
 to resolve the thorny problems arising from business transactions on the
 Internet.5
 Much of the demand for the development of a legal framework has
 come from those who use electronic commerce and want assurances that
 electronic transactions will be valid and binding, as well as certainty about
 the rules and remedies that apply to their transactions. Demands have also
 come from providers of support services for electronic commerce who seek
 legislation to clarify their responsibilities and their potential liability to
 users of their services or to third parties. The public has also been heard,
 expressing concerns about issues ranging from privacy6 and pornography7
 to protection against online purveyors of services.8 While much of the
 4. See A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, Draft #9 (July 1, 1997) at <http://www
 .iitf.nist.gov/eleccornm/ecomm.htm>.
 5. A frequently updated survey of states with enacted or pending electronic commerce
 legislation appears at the McBride, Baker & Coles website, (visited July 24, 1997) <http://
 mbc. com /ds_sum. html >.
 6. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Lives on File: The Erosion of Privacy, JN.Y. lIMES, June 12, 1997,
 at Al . Public outcries about privacy have had an impact. The Social Security Administration
 suspended previously announced plans to offer online services in response to privacy and
 security concerns raised in the popular press. Robert Pear, Social Security Closes On-Line Site,
 Citing Risks to Privacy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1997, at A15. See also Social Security Ruling 96-
 10p, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,808 (1996) (allowing customers to communicate electronically with
 Social Security Administration online); Meeting Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,525 (1997) (sus-
 pending online service).
 7. Communications Decency Act of 1996 (GDA), Pub.L. No. 104-104, § 501, 110 Stat.
 56, 133-36 (1996), struck down in part by ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 857 (E.D. Pa.
 1 996), aff'd, 1 1 7 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (invalidating portions of the CDA as violating free speech
 and due process).
 8. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538 (West 1996) (extending state law regulating
 advertising for the sale or lease of goods or services by telephone, mail order, or catalogue
 to the Internet).
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 popular press has focused on issues such as privacy and freedom of speech,
 a number of important issues have been raised regarding the use of new
 technologies by businesses, and the commercial law framework needed to
 support business done via the Internet.9
 Although often not apparent to the average business person or even the
 average lawyer, changes are currently underway, both domestically and
 internationally, to adapt existing commercial law doctrines to accommo-
 date electronic transactions and the technologies that underlie them. The
 Uniform Commercial Code (Code) is undergoing substantial revision in
 order to respond to changes in business practice and the use of electronic
 communications technologies.10 These revisions will provide many of the
 basic rules to support and facilitate electronic commerce, and, to the extent
 possible, are being coordinated with international efforts in the field.11
 While progress in the creation of uniform laws may not always be as visible
 to the business community and the business bar as are actions on Capitol
 Hill, efforts to expand uniform law efforts outside the Code to accom-
 modate electronic trade in a manner harmonious with the Code are also
 underway. Members of the business law bar should become aware of these
 developments because the pressing issues raised by electronic commerce
 both on and off the Internet are being subjected to thoughtful debate by
 the drafters of these revisions.
 What follows is a necessarily brief overview of the manner in which the
 Code is being revised and related legislation is being prepared to respond
 to the demands of an electronic age. While many of the revisions discussed
 below are not complete, a final product is anticipated within the next year.
 Contained in these various legislative efforts is a blueprint for the future
 of electronic commerce.
 9. Indeed, that is the thrust of the White House paper calling for a framework for global
 electronic commerce. See supra note 4. For example, on July 24, 1997, the Department of
 Commerce held a public forum on certificate authorities and digital signatures. See Public
 Forum on Certificate Authorities and Digital Signatures: Enhancing Global Electronic Com-
 merce, 62 Fed. Reg. 31,411 (1997).
 10. The official website of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
 Laws (NCCUSL) has the current drafts of the UCC articles under revision at <http://
 www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm> (visited July 17, 1997).
 1 1 . Foremost in the area is the work of the United Nations Commission on International
 Trade Law (UNCITRAL) through its Working Group on Electronic Commerce. In 1996,
 UNCITRAL gave its final approval to a new Model Law on Electronic Commerce which
 contains many provisions adapting the formalities of the law to an electronic environment.
 See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its twenty-ninth
 session, 28 May-14June 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/51/17
 Annex I (1996) reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 200 (1997) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. Work
 is currently underway to examine the use of electronic and digital signatures in international
 trade. See Report of the Working Group on Electronic Commerce on the Work of its thirty-first session,
 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/437 (1997). NCCUSL, one of the sponsors of the Code, has been
 working to coordinate its efforts with that of the U.S. Department of State to assure that the
 uniformity in laws is achieved internationally as well as domestically.
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 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: MATTERS OF BOTH FORM
 AND SUBSTANCE
 The term "electronic commerce" generally refers to the conduct of
 trade by means of electronic technologies in which computers play some
 integral role. Only a few years ago, the term electronic commerce encom-
 passed little more than "electronic data interchange" (EDI), or the com-
 puter-to-computer exchange of information (e.g., purchase orders and/or
 invoices) in standardized formats.12 Since then, however, the concept has
 expanded. The commercialization of the Internet has transformed the use
 of computers in business into a mass-media phenomenon. It is now clear
 that electronic commerce encompasses a wide range of activities. It in-
 cludes not only the conduct of trade on a closed basis with known trading
 parties, but the conduct of business in an open environment like the In-
 ternet where transactions frequently occur between parties with no prior
 (or subsequent) contact. It includes not only transactions between large,
 established businesses, but also transactions involving small businesses and
 individual consumers. Electronic commerce includes not only trade in
 traditional items, such as goods and services, but also trade in new forms
 of property, such as software and ideas. It includes not only uses of tech-
 nology in the contracting process, but also uses of technology in the per-
 formance of contractual obligations and the enforcement of rights and
 exercise of remedies online.
 A closer look at electronic commerce reveals the convergence of two
 distinct, but important, trends in the current transformation of the Ameri-
 can economy through the use of new information technologies. The first
 is the growing use of technology in conducting traditional business opera-
 tions. In its initial stages, electronic commerce was interpreted by many
 to mean the conduct of traditional trade (i.e., buying and selling goods)
 using electronic technologies in negotiation, contract formation, and, to
 some degree, performance of the business transaction. As such, businesses
 that adopt electronic contracting practices no longer use paper purchase
 orders or invoices to enter into sales transactions; agreements are made
 electronically and business is conducted electronically. In important re-
 spects, electronic commerce is a matter of "form," the form of traditional
 business carried on and the form of the traditional business relationship.
 The second trend reflects the nature of what is being traded. As the use
 of electronic technologies has expanded, the substance of commercial
 transactions has also changed. Information itself (rather than the medium
 in which it is found, such as a book) is frequently the subject matter of the
 transaction. Forms of information that once were not recognized as having
 12. One of the leading sources of information on electronic data interchange was pub-
 lished in The Business Lawyer. See ABA Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Com-
 mercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange - A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus.
 Law. 1645 (1990) [hereinafter ABA Report] .
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 market value are now commonly the subject of transactions, and segments
 of the economy that once were thought to be outside the mainstream of
 commerce, such as the entertainment industry, are drawn into it by new
 technologies. Assets such as software have moved from the realm of craft
 production to mass-market commodities.13
 In recent years, the American economy has been declared to be a post-
 industrial or information economy.14 In an information economy, intan-
 gible resources such as intellectual property and databases play a pivotal
 role in economic success. Opportunities in an information economy are
 global, not national. Information and technology exports play an increas-
 ingly crucial role in the United States' balance of payments with its trading
 partners.15 Commercial law principles established to regulate trade in
 goods can be adapted to trade in services and intellectual property only
 with difficulty; adapting them to the global information economy may be
 even more of a challenge.16 Of necessity, the Code must address this rise
 in economic importance of intangible assets and the need to develop co-
 herent, uniform contracting and commercial rules to govern transactions
 pertaining to them.17
 The challenge for the Code and for commercial law in general is two-
 fold: to accommodate new forms of property and, at the same time, to
 13. These changes are just as apparent within the legal profession as within business and
 industry. In the past, a lawyer establishing a new law office would purchase books (statutes,
 cases, and treatises) for her law library. Today's lawyer is more likely to acquire computer
 diskettes or CD-ROMs containing the relevant statutes, cases, and treatises; to enter into
 contracts with providers, such as WESTLAW or LEXIS, to access such materials; to search
 the Internet to find appropriate resources; and to use document assembly programs to draft
 documents and pleadings.
 14. George Guilder has declared the defining characteristic of an information economy
 to be the search for competitive advantage from the falling price of processing and com-
 municating information. George Guilder, Telecosm: Feasting on the Giant Peach, FORBES, Aug.
 1996, at S84.
 1 5. See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law
 Collide, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1645, 1646 (1996).
 16. The global nature of the Internet has been noted as one of its distinguishing features.
 See AGLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 117 S. Gt. 2329 (1997)
 (describing the Internet as "a decentralized, global medium of communications. . . . The
 Internet is an international system"). For a discussion of the particular challenges presented
 to the international community in responding to electronic commerce, see Boss, supra note
 3.
 17. While some parts of the Code, such as Article 9 on secured transactions, have always
 applied to all personal property, whatever its nature, and encompassed both tangible and
 intangible assets, other parts, such as Article 2, have been restricted to a goods-based model.
 Indeed, the same could be said of Article 6 (dealing with bulk transfers of goods) and Article
 7 (dealing with the warehousing or shipment of goods pursuant to a document of title). The
 payments articles of the Code, including Articles 3, 4, and 5, have had payments as their
 subject matter, and thus would appear to apply regardless of the subject matter of the un-
 derlying transactions. Article 8 stands out as the one article which concerns property (secu-
 rities) consisting of often intangible claims on an ongoing business, rather than claims on
 tangible property.
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 accommodate new means of contracting and performing contracts. In-
 deed, if the Code and other state laws are not adapted to the new demands
 of electronic commerce, the regulation of electronic commerce will be-
 come primarily the domain of federal regulation.18
 THE U.C.C. REACTS TO ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
 Although the Code was originally drafted in the 1940s and 1950s, its
 various articles have undergone repeated revision over the years to mod-
 ernize and clarify their provisions. In recent years, changes have been
 driven increasingly by the need to accommodate electronic commerce.
 Many of the provisions of the Code have been premised on the existence
 of a piece of paper, either to document the existence of a deal, or to
 represent certain underlying claims, such as rights to business interests
 (e.g., stock certificates) or to be paid (e.g., by check or other negotiable
 instrument). By the late 1960s, the required physical movement of paper
 documents to transfer effective title to securities was perceived as cum-
 bersome, time-consuming, and responsible for an unnecessary back-office
 "paperwork crunch."19 To resolve this problem, in 1978, revisions to Ar-
 ticle 8 were made to accommodate uncertificated securities by permitting
 the issuer or transfer agent of the stock to maintain records, presumably
 on computer, and effect stock transfers by a book entry system in lieu of
 issuing a paper stock certificate. The system envisaged by the drafters of
 the 1978 Article 8 failed to materialize, however, as offerors continued to
 issue paper certificates,20 electronic stock transfers did take place between
 broker-dealers, and the system that evolved in practice was based on a
 centralized system of holding certificates.21
 18. &i Julian B. McDonnell, The Code Project Confronts Fundamental Dilemmas, 26 LOYOLA
 L.A. L. Rev. 683 (1993).
 19. U.C.C. § 8 Prefatory Note (1995).
 20. The banks and broker-dealers, in cooperation with the Depository Trust Company
 (DTC), a trust company organized for the benefit of its participants, and the National Se-
 curities Clearing Corporation devised their own solution to the problem. A system of "in-
 direct" holding developed in which DTC maintained "jumbo" certificates representing
 shares in its possession, and transferred securities by adjustments to participants' accounts at
 DTC. Participant banks and broker-dealers in turn provided similar services to their own
 customers. The 1978 Article 8 could not accommodate this system because it was based on
 the assumption that investors would own securities directly, either in the form of physical
 certificates, or as book entries in the accounts of issuers or transfer agents.
 21. In response to the legal uncertainties created by the disjuncture between the vision of
 the 1978 Article 8 and the realities of business practice in this area, Article 8 was revised
 again in 1994. Rather than try to capture the complex relationships between investors and
 financial services intermediaries in the Article 8 provisions, the drafters defined a new term,
 "security entitlement." Id. § 8-102(a)(l 7) (1995). A security entitlement arises when a financial
 asset is credited to a securities account maintained with a financial intermediary. Id. § 8-50 1 .
 For an overview of the changes in Article 8, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr. et al., An Introduction
 to the Revised U.C.C. Article 8 and Review of Other Recent Developments with Investment Securities, 49
 Bus. Law. 1891 (1994); James Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43
 UCLAL. Rev. 1431 (1996).
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 The universal reliance by banks on computer processing facilities to
 handle the collection of checks led to the 1990 revisions to Article 4 of the
 Code. These revisions recognized the necessary implications of high speed
 information processing22 and the possibility of eliminating the flow of pa-
 per through the system by truncating the check collection process.23 More-
 over, banks already had moved a large portion of funds transfers away
 from the paper-based check system to the wire transfer system. As these
 paperless funds transfers were not subject to Articles 3 or 4, Article 4A
 was drafted to provide a comprehensive statement of legal rules to provide
 greater certainty to the participants in the wire transfer business.24 As is
 discussed later,25 one of the most significant innovations of Article 4A was
 the introduction of the concept of "commercially reasonable security pro-
 cedures" as a method for determining when a payment order should be
 attributed to a particular sender.26
 Other changes in the Code to accommodate electronic commerce have
 been less obvious. Several of the revisions to date have attempted to ad-
 dress the fact that commerce may be conducted without paper documents.
 For example, Article 8 in the 1994 revisions eliminated any statute of
 frauds writing requirement for contracts transferring interests in securi-
 ties.27 Article 5 on letters of credit was the first article of the Code to
 attempt to replace the concept of a writing with the concept of a "record,"
 defined as "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium, or that is
 stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable
 form."28 Moreover, while letters of credit traditionally have been viewed
 as payment against documents, the revised Article 5 "contemplates and
 facilitates the growing recognition of electronic and other nonpaper media
 22. See U.C.C. § 4-101, Official Comment (1984) (noting the need for rules "with ample
 provision for flexibility to meet the needs of the large volume handled and the changing
 needs and conditions that are bound to come with the years"). Some of the rules of Article
 4 are premised on the fact that computers, not humans, will process the checks. See, e.g., id.
 § 4-40 l(c) (1995) (post-dated checks); id. § 4-406, cmt. 4 (no duty to examine checks manu-
 ally): id. § 4-1 10 (permitting electronic presentment in place of delivery of the item itself).
 23. Id. § 4-101 , cmt. 3 ("The revisions in Article 4 are intended to create a legal framework
 that accommodates automation and truncation for the benefit of all bank customers.").
 24. U.C.C. §4A, Prefatory Note (1991). For a summary of the development of Article
 4A, see Fred H. Miller & William B. Davenport, Introduction to the Special Issue on the Uniform
 Commercial Code, 45 Bus. Law. 1389, 1391 (1990).
 25. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
 26. U.C.C. §4A-202 (1995).
 27. Revised § 8-1 13 provides: "A contract ... for the sale or purchase of a security is
 enforceable whether or not there is a writing signed or record authenticated by a party against
 whom enforcement is sought." As the Official Comment notes: "[t]he statute of frauds is
 unsuited to the realities of the securities business, . . . whatever benefits a statute of frauds
 may play in filtering out fraudulent claims are outweighed by the obstacles it places in the
 development of modern commercial practices in the securities business."
 28. U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(14) (1995).
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 as 'documents' "29 by broadly defining "document" to include presenta-
 tions in "a written or other medium permitted by the letter of credit or
 ... by the standard practice."30
 There are several revision projects currently underway which will be
 addressing electronic commerce issues more extensively. Drafting com-
 mittees are currently at work on revisions to Article 2 on the sale of goods,
 Article 2A on leases of goods, Article 9 on secured transactions, and Article
 1 on general provisions. In addition, there is a drafting committee creating
 a new Article 2B to deal with software contracts and licenses of informa-
 tion. Each of these efforts is motivated in whole or in part by a desire to
 deal with the problems encountered in the growth of electronic commerce.
 As early as 1991, a study group commissioned by the Permanent Editorial
 Board of the Uniform Commercial Code to examine the sale of goods
 provisions of Article 2 of the Code concluded that revision of the article
 was appropriate and timely in light of technology-driven changes in com-
 mercial practices.31
 Additionally, in 1996, recognizing that the contracting issues raised by
 electronic commerce were far broader than those covered by the Code,
 NCCUSL established a Drafting Committee on Electronic Communica-
 tions in Contractual Transactions. The charge to that committee was "to
 draft such revisions to general contract law as are necessary or desirable
 to support transaction processes utilizing existing and future electronic or
 computerized technologies,"32 and to do so in a manner consistent with
 the comparable provisions of the Code as revised.33
 CONTRACTING THROUGH THE USE OF ELECTRONIC
 TECHNOLOGIES
 In the early 1970s, businesses began to replace traditional paper-based
 means of communication with electronic communication technologies.
 Certain companies began to transact business using "electronic data in-
 29. /¿§5-102, cmt. 2.
 30. Id. § 5-102(a)(6). Thus, one may make a presentation by an electronic medium so long
 as either standard practice recognizes such a presentment or the letter of credit explicitly
 authorizes it.
 31. PEB Study Group: Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2, Executive Summary (Mar. 5, 1991),
 reprinted in 46 Bus. Law. 1869 (1991). See Amelia H. Boss, Developments on the Fringe: Article 2
 Revisions, Computer Contracting, and Suretyship, 46 Bus. Law. 1803 (1991).
 32. NCCUSL Drafting Committee for Electronic Communications in Contractual Trans-
 actions, Memorandum to Scope and Program Committee (Jan. 3, 1997) (as approved by the Scope
 and Program and the Executive Committees). The chair of the Drafting Committee is Pro-
 fessor Patricia Blumenfeld Fry of the University of North Dakota Law School. The reporter
 is Professor D. Benjamin Beard of the University of Idaho College of Law. See also Reporter's
 Memorandum (Apr. 10, 1997) (visited July 11, 1997) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/
 ulc/ulc.htm>.
 33. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing the work of the drafting com-
 mittee).
This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 18:39:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Emerging Law of Electronic Commerce 1477
 terchange," a method for the electronic communication of business data
 between computers in standardized formats.34 Although this type of com-
 mercial practice offered significant cost and time savings to its users, it
 raised a number of perplexing issues involving the application of existing
 legal rules and principles. In particular, existing rules from the common
 law or the Code regarding contract formation, contract validity, and con-
 tract terms were considered inadequate for assuring the legal validity and
 enforceability of contracts formed through the use of electronic media.35
 In response to those perceived problems, and in the absence of appropriate
 statutory revisions to accommodate electronic commercial practices, par-
 ties doing business electronically began to execute "trading partner agree-
 ments" or "interchange agreements" in an attempt to resolve contractually
 the legal uncertainties they faced.36
 Nonetheless, there was a continuing recognition that the answer to the
 uncertainties of electronic commerce lay not in the execution of such
 agreements, but in the clarification of the rules applicable to electronic
 commerce, particularly with the growth of the use of the Internet, where
 parties frequently interact without execution of any overarching agree-
 ment. Particular issues requiring resolution included the application of
 "statute of frauds" requirements to electronic environments; the satisfac-
 tion of traditional formal requirements such as a "writing" or "signature";
 the attribution of electronic messages to the sender; and the methods of
 contract formation. The pending revisions to the Code go a long way
 toward resolving many of these uncertainties.
 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS; WRITINGS AND SIGNATURES
 The application of the statute of frauds37 has been of particular con-
 34. See ABA Report, supra note 1 2 (providing an introduction to EDI).
 35. Id. at 1649-50.
 36. One of the first domestic model trading partner agreements was a product of the
 Section of Business Law. In 1 990, the Electronic Messaging Task Force produced a report
 and model EDI trading partner agreement to promote greater predictability and uniformity
 in the drafting and interpretation of private contractual relations governing EDI relation-
 ships. See generally id. Other groups throughout the world also addressed the issues of electronic
 commerce through model agreements. &£ Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Data Interchange Agreements:
 Private Contracting Toward a Global Environment, 13 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 31 (1992); Amelia
 H. Boss & Jeffrey B. Ritter, Electronic Data Interchange Agreements (ICG
 1993). In 1996, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Working Party on
 the Facilitation of International Trade Procedures (WP.4) developed a Model Interchange
 Agreement for the International Use of Electronic Data Interchange to promote the use of
 EDI in international trade.
 37. The statute of frauds provision currently in Article 2 requires a writing. U.C.C. § 2-
 201 (1995). A writing includes anything printed, typewritten, or made subject to any other
 intentional reduction to tangible form. Id. § 1-201(46). See also id. § 1-206(1) (general statute
 of frauds provisions for transactions over $5000).
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 cern.38 Despite attempts to eliminate the statute of frauds completely,39 all
 current revisions to the Code have retained it in some form. In order to
 accommodate electronic commerce, however, the current versions do not
 require a "writing" which is "signed." What is required instead is a "rec-
 ord" which has been "authenticated" by the person against whom en-
 forcement is sought.40
 This resolution of the statute of frauds problem demonstrates the two-
 fold approach currently adopted by the Code revisions. First, the revisions
 substitute the concept of a "record" for the concept of a writing. The term
 "record" is defined as "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium
 or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in
 perceivable form."41 This definition clearly contemplates electronic mes-
 sages. Second, the revisions use the term "authenticating" a record to
 replace the concept of "signing."
 Authenticate means to sign, or to execute or adopt a symbol ... or
 encrypt a record in whole or in part with present intent to identify
 the authenticating party, or to adopt or accept a record or term, or
 to establish the authenticity ... of a record or term that contains the
 authentication or to which a record containing the authentication
 refers.42
 The drafts of Articles 2, 2 A, and 2B frequently speak of "authenticated
 records" rather than "signed writings" in provisions other than the statute
 of frauds. Indeed, Article 2B even provides that authenticated records
 within the meaning of that article will satisfy writing and signature re-
 quirements of other law.43 All these changes make electronic transactions
 38. As recently as 1996, a Georgia court held that a fax did not constitute a written notice
 because it was only "beeps and chirps." Dep't of Transp. v. Norris, 474 S.E.2d 216, 218
 (Ga. App. 1996). For an analysis of cases on both sides of the issue, see Benjamin Wright,
 Writings and Signatures, in The Law OF Electronic Commerce ch. 16 (2d ed., Nov. 1996).
 39. The statute of frauds has been eliminated effectively in sales of securities covered by
 Article 8. See supra note 27. Early drafts of revised Article 2 eliminated the writing requirement
 of U.C.C, section 2-201, but the May 1997 draft of Article 2 followed the drafts of Articles
 2A and 2B by retaining the requirement.
 40. U.C.C. § 2B-201(a) (May 5, 1997 draft); id. § 2-201(a) (May 16, 1997 draft); id. § 2A-
 201 (a) (May 1997 draft). The statute of frauds provision of Article 9 is a bit different; it
 requires a "signed" security agreement, id. § 9-203(l)(a), but "sign" is defined to mean "to
 identify a record by means of a signature, mark, or other symbol with intent to authenticate
 it." Id. § 9-102(a)(38) (Apr. 14, 1997 discussion draft).
 41. Id. §2B-102(a)(31) (May 5, 1997 draft); id. § 2-102(a)(25) (May 16, 1997 draft); id.
 § 2A-102(a)(23) (May 16, 1997 draft); id. § 9-102(a)(30) (Apr. 14, 1997 discussion draft); id.
 §5-102(a)(14).
 42. Id. § 2B-102(a)(2) (May 5, 1997 draft); see also id. § 2-102(a)(l) (May 16, 1997 draft)
 (containing a slightly different wording). See § 9-102(a)(38) (Apr. 14, 1997 discussion draft)
 ("sign" means to identify a record by means of a signature, mark, or other symbol with intent
 to authenticate it).
 43. U.C.C. § 2B-104(b)(l) (May 5, 1997 draft).
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 as valid as if executed on paper, and thereby enhance the use of electronic
 technologies.44
 In recent months, a great deal of attention has been paid to the idea of
 "electronic" or "digital" signatures and their use in electronic commerce.
 To the extent business people want assurances that these digital signatures
 will meet the formal requirements for binding commercial transactions,
 the proposed revisions should resolve some of their most obvious and
 pressing concerns. These revisions affirm by statute the general validity of
 electronic contracting, a proposition long accepted by the majority of
 courts deciding cases in this area.45
 ATTRIBUTION
 The concepts of "record" and "authentication" alone are not a thor-
 ough-going solution to the problems raised by electronic contracting; ad-
 ditional revisions deal with other specific issues. One of the pivotal issues
 in electronic commerce is the problem of binding an electronic message
 with the person who purports to send it. While electronic commerce may
 seem to take place in "cyberspace," online identities ultimately must be
 matched up with responsible parties in the physical world. Transactions
 conducted over computer systems are inherently at risk from a breach of
 the computer security system. The risk may come from internal sources,
 such as disgruntled employees, or external sources, such as competitors or
 hackers. Those who conduct business electronically face two related prob-
 lems associated with "authenticating" the sender of a message. First, they
 want to know that, when they receive an electronic message, they can rely
 upon the message as from the purported sender. Second, they want to
 avoid liability themselves in the event a message purporting to come from
 the identified sender actually was sent by an interloper or malefactor.
 The provisions of Article 4A governing the attribution of payment or-
 ders in electronic funds transfers systems provided the model for the cur-
 rently-proposed revisions. Article 4A provides that a person will be bound
 by a payment order in three situations. The first two, which merely restate
 the common law, are noncontroversial: if either the identified sender au-
 thorized the payment order or is otherwise bound by it under the law of
 agency, that order is treated as authorized and the sender is obligated.46
 The third rule, however, is an innovation: if the parties have agreed to
 follow certain commercially reasonable security procedures to verify the
 authenticity of the payment order, any payment order received pursuant
 44. The tactic of using different terminology (e.g., "record" and "authentication") is not
 the only approach that may be used to resolve electronic commerce issues. See, e.g., UNCI-
 TRAL Model Law, supra note 1 1 (providing that where the law requires a writing or signature,
 it may be satisfied in the electronic environment in a specified way).
 45. See WRIGHT, supra note 38, for a discussion of the case law.
 46. U.C.C. § 4A-202(a) (1995).
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 to those procedures, whether or not "truly authorized," is deemed to be
 effective against the identified sender.47
 The presumption arising from the use of agreed-upon security proce-
 dures is rebuttable. The payment order is unenforceable if the identified
 sender can prove the order was not made by any person whom the sender
 entrusted with the means to send it.48 If the payment order was sent by
 someone who gained access to the purported sender's transmission facili-
 ties or access device, the sender cannot avoid liability because the as-
 sumption is that the sender is in the best position to guard against such
 unauthorized access. If, however, the sender can prove the payment order
 was not sent through its transmission facilities, it can avoid liability.
 Thus, under Article 4A, apart from common-law notions of authori-
 zation or agency, a purported sender is only bound if the payment order
 is sent pursuant to an agreed-upon security procedure. Even then, use of
 such a security procedure only gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that
 the purported sender is bound. If the purported sender can establish that
 the order emanated from an interloper outside the purported sender's
 control and with whom it had no contact, the sender can escape liability,
 but the burden of demonstrating that fact rests with the purported sender.
 Proposed Article 2B adopts the notion of an attribution procedure
 which is similar to the security procedure defined in Article 4A. An attri-
 bution procedure is one adopted by the parties to verify that received
 electronic messages actually were sent by one or the other of them.49 If,
 acting in good faith, the receiving party properly applies an attribution
 procedure and determines a message was from the other party, then the
 other party is bound.50 Unlike Article 4A, Article 2B does not provide any
 statutory means for an alleged sender to overcome the presumption that
 the message came from it by establishing that the message came from an
 interloper. The only way under the statute for an alleged sender to escape
 liability is to demonstrate that there was no agreed-upon attribution pro-
 cedure, that the attribution procedure was not commercially reasonable,51
 or that the receiving party did not act in good faith or comply with the
 attribution procedure.
 Article 2B goes even further, imposing liability for messages even where
 there is no agreed-upon or mutually adopted attribution procedure. A
 message is attributable to a party where: (i) the message was sent by a
 person who obtained access to the necessary access number or devices
 from a source under the control of an alleged sender; (ii) the access resulted
 from an alleged sender's failure to exercise reasonable care in protecting
 47. Id. § 4A-202(b).
 48. Id. § 4A-203(a)(2).
 49. U.C.C. § 2B-1 10 (May 5, 1997 draft).
 50. Id. § 2B-1 1 1 (a)(2).
 5 1 . Section 2B- 1 1 0(a) provides that, for a procedure to qualify as an attribution procedure,
 it must be commercially reasonable.
This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 18:39:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Emerging Law of Electronic Commerce 1481
 the number or device; and (iii) the receiving party relied upon the message
 to its detriment.52 This standard combines a principle of estoppel with a
 fault-based liability rule: a person who negligently permits a message to
 be sent is bound by that message to anyone who detrimentally relies on
 that message. This provision, however, differs in one respect from tradi-
 tional estoppel notions. Rather than limit recovery only to the extent of
 any reasonable reliance, it deems the message effective as an undertaking
 of the alleged sender.53
 These new attribution procedures of Article 2B, which will be reflected
 in the provisions of Articles 2 and 2A, and possibly Article 1 as well, are
 still in the process of evolution. When an electronic message that was not
 authorized in fact should be deemed effective is a problem raised in most
 acute form in the context of open networks, such as the Internet. Given
 the growing significance of electronic commerce on the Internet, these
 provisions will be subjected to vigorous debate before their final form is
 determined.
 ELECTRONIC AGENTS
 With recent advances in information technology, the use of computer
 programs to send or respond to messages automatically has moved from
 the realm of science fiction to business reality. Computers are now rou-
 tinely programmed to take actions, such as sending purchase orders or
 acknowledgments, which would typically lead to the formation of a con-
 tract if the actions had been taken directly by a human actor. The revisions
 to Articles 2, 2A, and 2B recognize the existence of what are known as
 "electronic agents,"54 computer programs designed to act on behalf of a
 party without the need for human review.55 The draft provisions are de-
 signed to provide guidance to a court confronted with the use of electronic
 agents but reluctant to apply the traditional rules of agency law to this
 new context. They make it clear that parties may act through the use of
 electronic agents and are bound by their performance and messages.56
 Operations of an electronic agent may be effective to form an agreement,
 52. Id. § 2B-1 1 l(a)(3) (May 5, 1997 draft).
 53. Cf. UN CITRAL Model Law, supra note 1 1, Article 13 (purported sender responsible for
 acts of any person gaining access to facilities or devices through relationship with the pur-
 ported sender or its agent without any reliance requirement; presumption only rebuttable if
 recipient knew or should have known of hacker).
 54. U.C.C. §2-102(a)(12) (May 16, 1997 draft); id. § 2A-102(a)(8) (May 1997 draft); id.
 § 2B-102(a)(13) (May 5, 1997 draft).
 55. An example of this type of electronic agent in use in Internet electronic commerce
 today can be found on the website of Cisco Systems, Inc., a leading provider of routers and
 software for Internet service providers. See Cisco Systems, Networked Commerce (visited July 1 1 ,
 1 997) <http://www.cisco.com/public/ordsum.html>.
 56. U.C.C, section 2B-202 (May 5, 1997 draft) makes it clear that an agreement may be
 made through the operation of an electronic agent.
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 even if no individual knows of or reviews the action or its results.57 Thus,
 any lingering questions about the apparent absence of a "meeting of the
 minds" are eliminated.
 CONTRACT FORMATION
 As noted above, the proposed revisions to the Code recognize that con-
 tracts may be formed and performed through the use of electronic agents.
 In addition, where electronic communications are used, the revisions set
 forth specific rules on the timing and effectiveness of a message. As a
 general matter, an electronic message is effective when it is received.58
 Moreover, where a contract is formed through the exchange of two elec-
 tronic messages, the contract is deemed formed when the response con-
 stituting the acceptance is received,59 a clear abrogation of the common-
 law "mailbox rule" which has been deemed inappropriate for an
 electronic environment.60 Receipt is a defined term: "An electronic record
 is received when it enters an information processing system in a form
 capable of being processed by a system . . . the recipient uses or has des-
 ignated . . . for the purpose of receiving such [messages]."61 It is not nec-
 essary for "receipt" for the recipient to know of, open, or read the message.
 All that is required is that it be available for processing.
 OTHER CONTRACTING ISSUES
 The changes previously outlined are simply an overview of the changes
 to be expected in the Code to accommodate electronic commerce. To
 embrace electronic commerce fully, however, a more comprehensive re-
 vision of general contract law is clearly appropriate. In response to that
 need, NCCUSL established a Drafting Committee to develop a law gov-
 erning "Electronic Communications in Contractual Transactions."62 The
 57. U.C.C. § 2B-203(e) (May 5, 1997 draft). The provision continues by giving special
 rules applicable to these electronic transactions.
 58. Id. § 2B-203(b). This is subject to special rules applicable where the originator of a
 message requests that receipt of the message be acknowledged electronically. Id. § 2B-205.
 59. Id. § 2B-204(a)(l).
 60. This result is consistent with the result on virtually all model trading partner agree-
 ments which have addressed the issue. See Boss & RlTTER, supra note 36, at 54-58. It is also
 consistent with the Convention on the International Sale of Goods, which follows the rule
 that messages are effective upon receipt and applies to transnational transactions between
 members of Convention signatories, unless the parties expressly provide otherwise. United
 Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Article 18(2), Apr.
 1 1, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 671, 675 (acceptance of an offer is effective when received by offeror).
 61. U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(30) (May 5, 1997 draft).
 62. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The April 10, 1997 draft of the law is
 available at Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts (visited July 6, 1997) <http://www.law.upenn
 .edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>.
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 committee had its first meeting in May 1997. Although it would be pre-
 mature to discuss in any detail the uniform law this committee will pro-
 duce,63 certain general observations may be made. First, the primary pur-
 pose of the statute will be to permit the expansion of electronic commercial
 practices and to promote the development of the legal infrastructure nec-
 essary to support electronic commerce.64 Second, the general approach of
 the Code revisions (using terms such as "record" and "authenticate" to
 substitute for "writing" and "signature") undoubtedly will be followed, as
 will the general approaches to attribution and contract formation. In ad-
 dition, specific rules dealing with other matters may be included. An initial
 preliminary draft covered such issues as defining an "original" record,65
 the rules governing admissibility of electronic records into evidence,66 the
 standards for retaining electronic records,67 and determining the time and
 place of dispatch and receipt of electronic messages.68 Currently under
 discussion is the extent to which the new law will address specific issues
 arising from the use of electronic digital signatures and the implementation
 of a public key infrastructure.69
 ARTICLE 2B: LICENSING OF INFORMATION AND
 SOFTWARE CONTRACTS
 In addition to containing important electronic contracting provisions,
 the new Article 2B significantly expands the present scope of the Code,
 63. A final statute is highly unlikely before the summer of 1999.
 64. The April 1 0 draft contains a list of underlying purposes of the Act. Even if such a
 provision is not in the final product, there is no doubt that this is indeed the underlying
 purpose. Indeed, specific provisions of the draft articulated the general principle that elec-
 tronic communications should not be denied legal effect solely on the ground the record is
 in electronic form.
 65. The April 10 draft considered by the drafting committee approached the issue of
 "original" in the same manner as the UNCFTRAL Model Law, supra note 11, Article 8.
 66. Here, the UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 1 1, Article 9, is again the prototype.
 67. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 11, Article 10.
 68. The determination of the time and place of receipt may become important in the
 application of choice-of-law or forum principles. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 1 1 ,
 Article 15.
 69. A tutorial is available which serves as a basic introduction to asymmetric cryptography
 and its use in creating digital signatures. See ABA Information Security Committee, Section
 of Science and Technology, Digital Signature Guidelines (visited July 11, 1997) <http://www
 . abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsg-toc.html>.
 A number of states have enacted or are considering some form of legislation recognizing
 electronic or digital signatures. Current citations to such legislation may be found at McBride,
 Baker & Coles, Summary of Legislation Relating to Digital Signatures, Electronic Signatures, and Cryp-
 tography (last modified July 1 1, 1997) <http://mbc.com/ds_sum.html>. The Commonwealth
 of Massachusetts, Information Technology Division Legal Department website, <http://
 www.magnet.state.ma.us/itd/legal/>, provides background information on policy issues as-
 sociated with the creation of the "public key infrastructures" that could regulate and admin-
 ister the use of asymmetric cryptography in electronic commerce, as well as provides
 information about Massachusetts draft legislation. Given the wide range in types of legislation
 being considered, the area is one ripe for uniform legislation.
This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 18:39:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1484 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 52, August 1997
 and embraces types of transactions typically encountered in the conduct
 of electronic commerce. Given the ever-increasing use of computers in
 business environments, one of the more frequently litigated issues con-
 cerning the scope of the Code was the application of Article 2 to computer
 software contracts.70 Two problems arose in applying Article 2 to these
 transactions. First, software, unlike goods, is not bought or sold; it is li-
 censed. Thus, the structure of the transaction is different. Second, the
 subject matter of the transaction is not goods. The purchaser or licensee
 of software is not interested in acquiring the diskette or physical medium,
 but rather the information contained in the software. It is the information,
 not the material representation of it, that is the subject matter of the deal.
 The sponsors of the Code initially explored the feasibility of covering
 computer software under the Code by restructuring the provisions of Ar-
 ticle 2 to distinguish between core provisions applicable to all contracts
 (the hub) and those restricted to particular forms of contracts, such as sales,
 leases, or licenses (the spokes). Concluding such a "hub and spokes" ap-
 proach was too ambitious to be practicable at the present, NCCUSL, one
 of the sponsors of the Code revisions, decided it would be more appro-
 priate to develop a separate article of the Code (Article 2B) to cover li-
 censing agreements. As a result, in 1995, a new committee was created to
 draft a new article to the UCC, Article 2B, to cover licensing transactions.
 The current project, which requires approval by both of the sponsors of
 the Code, the American Law Institute, and NCCUSL, may be completed
 as early as August of 1998.
 Article 2B will apply to software contracts and licenses of information.71
 All software contracts will be covered, whether structured as sales or li-
 censes. By contrast, only "licenses" of "information" will be covered. The
 scope of Article 2B with regard to information is defined both by the form
 of the transaction, a license, and by the subject matter of the transaction,
 information. The definition of license is designed to show the conditional
 or limited nature of the rights granted and excludes transfers of security
 interests, transfers of ownership rights in intellectual property, and trans-
 fers of licenses in intellectual property implied by law.72 The definition of
 information includes data, text, images, sounds, computer programs, data-
 bases, literary works, audiovisual works, motion pictures, mask works or
 70. For a sampling of the literature appearing within the pages of The Business Lawyer on
 this topic, see Amelia H. Boss, Developments on the Fringe: Article 2 Revisions, Computer Contracting,
 and Suretyship, 46 Bus. Law. 1803 (1991); Amelia H. Boss et al., Scope of the Uniform Commercial
 Code: Advances in Technology and Survey of Computer Contracting Cases, 44 Bus. Law. 1671 (1989);
 Amelia H. Boss & William J. Woodward, Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code: Survey of Computer
 Contracting Cases, 43 Bus. Law. 1513 (1988); Jeffrey B. Ritter, Software Transactions and Unifor-
 mity: Accommodating Codes Under the Code, 46 Bus. Law. 1825 (1991); Jeffrey B. Ritter, Scope of
 the Uniform Commercial Code: Computer Contracting Cases and Electronic Commercial Practices, 45 Bus.
 Law. 2533 (1990).
 71. U.C.C. § 2B-103 (May 5, 1997 Draft).
 72. Id. § 2B-102(22) (defining "license").
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 the like, and any intellectual property or other rights in the information.73
 This is meant to include the copyright industries (e.g., music, motion pic-
 tures, television, and publishing), but will exclude sales of books and news-
 papers (because those transactions are sales, not licenses) and patent li-
 censes.
 In expanding the scope of the Code to cover licenses for information,
 the drafters are taking a dramatic step that recognizes the complex changes
 in the nature of commercial transactions - tangible goods are no longer
 the primary focus of commerce. Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude
 that in bringing information licensing within the scope of the Code, the
 attempt is to codify a substantive body of law governing all rights in in-
 formation. Those substantive rights are determined by law outside the
 Code such as intellectual property law, both federal (patents, trademarks,
 and copyrights) and state (trade secrets, etc.), as well as the law of privacy.
 Article 2B does not purport to set forth substantive rules governing infor-
 mation and its ownership; rather, it merely sets forth the contracting rules
 which will govern the commercial relationships between parties in an in-
 formation licensing or software transaction.
 While not defining the substantive attributes of information assets, Ar-
 ticle 2B nevertheless tailors its rules to conform to the subject matter of
 licensing transactions. In that regard, Article 2B facilitates the incorpo-
 ration of electronic commerce into the general body of contract law and
 accommodates the special issues raised by software contracts and infor-
 mation licensing. First, the manner in which many information licensing
 and software transactions are entered into74 is sufficiently different from
 traditional modes of contracting that some modification of basic contract-
 ing principles is warranted. Second, the nature of licensing, and the special
 characteristics of information and software as commercial assets, are such
 that it is necessary to have different default rules applicable in the absence
 of a contrary agreement by the parties.75 Third, the nature of information
 transactions, many of which may be entered into and performed online,
 engenders concerns not traditionally present in commercial transactions.
 73. Id. § 2B-102(19) (defining "information").
 74. One might attempt to talk about the manner in which such transactions are "nego-
 tiated," but it would be misleading to characterize the process in that way. First, with the
 increasing use of the Internet and electronic technologies in the acquisition of information
 and software, the process bears little resemblance to the negotiation traditionally character-
 istic of large commercial transactions. Deals may be concluded with the mere click of a
 button. Second, in the acquisition of software and information products through traditional
 retail operations, terms are often on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. These types of transactions,
 resulting in what is colloquially called a "shrink-wrap license," or what Article 2B would call
 a "mass market license," represent the parties' agreement in name only. See Arthur Leff,
 Contract as Thing, 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131 (1970); Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of
 Adhesion, 22 OsGOODE Hall L.J. 5 (1984).
 75. As with all rules under the Code, the default rules of Article 2B are subject to the
 overriding ability of the parties to vary them by agreement. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1995).
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 One of the most significant innovations of Article 2B is its recognition
 of what is called a "mass-market license."76 A mass market license has two
 distinguishing features: (i) licenses are offered on a take-it-or-leave it basis
 by the licensor to a licensee who cannot negotiate terms; and (ii) the license
 is offered to the public at large without regard to the identity of the li-
 censee. Examples include sales of shrinkwrap software through a retail
 outlet, or the sale of information by the operator of a website to anyone
 who agrees to pay its price and accepts the terms and conditions found
 there. These two characteristics result in certain special mass-market rules.
 First, a licensee who agrees to a mass-market license becomes bound by
 its terms unless those terms can be found to be "deal breakers,"77 are
 unconscionable,78 or are specifically barred in mass-market licenses by the
 provisions of Article 2B.79 Second, because mass-market licenses for soft-
 ware are frequently used in transactions resembling the sale of goods (e.g.,
 the "over-the-counter" purchase of software), Article 2B follows the Article
 2 goods-based rules on such matters as implied warranties of quality80 and
 standards of performance.81 Third, because of the anonymous nature of
 mass-market licenses, Article 2B adopts the default rule that such licenses
 are transferrable by the licensee unless specifically prohibited in the li-
 cense.82
 76. A "mass-market transaction" is defined as a transaction in a retail market for infor-
 mation, directed to the general public as a whole under substantially the same terms for the
 same information. Id. § 2B-102(a)(26) (May 5, 1997 Draft). It includes all consumer trans-
 actions, but will not include non-consumer transactions above a particular dollar limit yet to
 be determined. Limiting the scope of the mass market by providing a dollar cap ranging
 from $500 or $1000 to $20,000 per transaction has been proposed.
 77. Id. § 2B-308(b). "Deal breakers" are terms which the licensor should know would
 cause a reasonable licensee to refuse the license if brought to the licensee's attention. None-
 theless, if the licensee proceeds to manifest assent specifically to that term, it shall be deemed
 to have accepted that term. Id. § 2B-308(c).
 78. The unconscionability provision of draft section 2B-109, which follows that currently
 found in present section 2-302, allows a court to invalidate a term in any agreement upon a
 finding of unconscionability.
 79. See, e.g., id. § 2B-105 (provision in non-2B transaction "opting in" to the rules of Article
 2B unenforceable in mass market license); id. § 2B-313(c)(l) (effect of disclaimer against vi-
 ruses limited in mass market); id. § 2B-406(c) (conspicuous disclaimer required in mass-market
 license). Additionally, there are other terms that are either mandated or proscribed in all
 consumer licenses. See id. § 2B-106 (special choice-of-law rule for consumers in absence of
 agreement); id. § 2B-107 (invalidating choice-of-forum clause, where forum would not oth-
 erwise have jurisdiction over the consumer and would unfairly disadvantage the consumer);
 id. § 2B-303 (limiting effect of no-oral modification clause); id. § 2B-618 (hell and high water
 clauses not presumptively enforceable). In addition, some contractual provisions may be
 preempted by application of state and federal intellectual property law.
 80. Id. § 2B-403 (paralleling implied warranty of merchantability of section 2-314).
 81. See id. §§ 2B-601 and 2B-607 (perfect tender rule applied to mass-market license in-
 volving delivery of a copy); id. § 2B-610 (allowing rejection for defective tender in mass market
 transaction).
 82. Id. § 2B-502(b)(l).
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 With regard to performance standards, Article 2B follows the general
 rule that a party's failure to comply with the terms of the contract is a
 breach giving rise to damages. An exception is made, as previously noted,
 in the case of information distributed through a mass market where a single
 copy is at issue. Article 2B gives the licensee the right to reject any non-
 conforming tender under the Article 2 "perfect tender" rule.83 Outside
 that situation, however, Article 2B follows the common-law rule of "sub-
 stantial performance." This makes the breaching party liable to the ag-
 grieved party for damages, but prevents the aggrieved party from avoiding
 its obligations under the contract (such as the licensee's duty to pay) based
 on the breach.84 This decision reflects the difficulty of achieving a "perfect
 tender" with products as complex as software and recognizes that trans-
 actions covered by Article 2B, such as software development contracts,
 include a large services component.
 The warranty provisions of Article 2B reflect some of the special con-
 cerns associated with information and software contracts. In a licensing
 agreement, the licensor retains rights to the information being licensed;
 consequently, no title passes and it is a misnomer to speak of any "warranty
 of title." Rather, a licensor warrants that it has the authority to transfer
 the rights granted by the license; that the licensor will not interfere with
 the licensee's enjoyment of those rights; and that no third person will
 interfere based on a claim arising from an act of the licensor.85 These
 warranties do not apply to claims of infringement. Outside an exclusive
 license, where the licensor warrants that it owns the intellectual property
 rights to be transferred, the licensor under the current draft only warrants
 it "has no reason to know" of any possible intellectual property infringe-
 ment; the licensor does not warrant that no such claims exist or that the
 intellectual property rights transferred are valid.86 An alternative under
 discussion by the committee would add a new subsection imposing an
 indemnity obligation on the licensor in the event of any successful infringe-
 ment claim against the licensee.87
 With regard to the quality of the subject matter transferred, Article 2B
 applies different warranties to (i) computer programs, (ii) informational
 content, and (iii) development contracts.88 With regard to computer pro-
 grams, the licensee wants to be sure that the program will perform as
 expected. For computer programs sold in mass-market transactions, a war-
 83. Id. § 2-60 1 ( 1 995) (perfect tender applies only to the initial tender of goods in a contract
 that does not involve an installment sale).
 84. Id. § 2B-601 (May 5, 1997 draft); id. §§ 2B- 102(38) and 2B-108; Restatement (Sec-
 ond) of Contracts § 237 (1979).
 85. U.C.C. § 2B-401(a) (May 5, 1997 draft).
 86. Id. alt. A.
 87. Id. alt. B.
 88. Id.
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 ranty of merchantability is made.89 Outside the mass-market context, a
 merchant warrants that the program will substantially conform with any
 promises or statements made in the documentation or specifications pro-
 vided by the licensor.90
 In the case of informational content, the main concern of the licensee
 is the accuracy of the information conveyed. Imposing a strict liability
 standard in the case of inaccuracies in information would have a pro-
 foundly negative effect on the information industry. In essence, adopting
 the common law doctrine of negligent misrepresentation,91 Article 2B pro-
 vides that a merchant providing informational content warrants only that
 there is no inaccuracy caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care.92
 Moreover, this warranty only applies where the information is provided
 in a "special relationship of reliance," following those cases which refuse
 to impose liability in the absence of a "special relationship" justifying a
 duty of reasonable care between the parties.93
 Concerns about the potential exposure of information service providers,
 such as newspapers, publishers, and other mass marketers of information,
 and the desire not to inhibit the flow of such information has led to an
 additional exclusion. There is no warranty of accuracy in cases of "pub-
 lished informational content," a concept which refers to information made
 available without being customized for a particular business situation of a
 particular licensee.94
 In the case of contracts for custom development or design of software
 or information, Article 2B recognizes that the transaction may be viewed
 as a services contract, in which case the licensee is contracting for work-
 manlike efforts on the part of the licensor. Thus, the warranty given by
 such a licensor is that of "workmanlike efforts." There is not an implied
 promise that the licensor will actually achieve the purposes sought by the
 licensee. Article 2B recognizes, however, that the parties, in certain cir-
 cumstances, intend a contrary result - that the licensor will not be paid
 unless the software or information achieves a certain purpose. If the cir-
 cumstances show such an understanding, there is an implied warranty that
 the information will be fit for such purpose.95
 89. Id. §2B-403 (May 5, 1997 draft) (titled, "Implied Warranty: Quality of Computer
 Program").
 90. Id. § 2B-403(b).
 91. Restatement (Second) of Torts 6 552 (1976).
 92. U.C.C. § 2B-404 (May 5, 1997 draft) (titled, "Implied Warranty: Informational Con-
 tent and Services"). This follows the reasoning of cases such as Milau Associates, Inc. v. North
 Avenue Development Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1247 (N.Y. 1977), and Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434
 N.W.2d 97 (Wise. Ct. App. 1988).
 93. See Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ. Ct. 1987); A.T. Kearney,
 Inc. v. IBM, 73 F.3d 238 (9th Cir. 1995).
 94. U.C.C. § 2B-404(b)(2) (May 5, 1997 draft).
 95. Id. § 2B-405(a)(l). The current draft currently combines the treatment of development
 and design contracts with another, arguably distinct, transaction, where the licensee specif-
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 COMPUTER VIRUSES
 Liability for computer viruses96 has been of particular concern in the
 Article 2B drafting process. Two issues on which consensus has not been
 reached are the obligation imposed on a party to assure that any infor-
 mation tendered is free from any virus and the manner in which liability
 for viruses may be disclaimed. Although computer viruses may be intro-
 duced during the development or manufacturing process, they are most
 frequently introduced into computer systems as a result of improper ac-
 tivity by third parties. Licensors therefore have argued that imposing lia-
 bility on them without regard to fault for the acts of third parties would
 be inappropriate. They favor a standard which merely imposes upon them
 the obligation to use reasonable care to exclude viruses. Licensees, how-
 ever, consider software or information containing viruses as inherently
 unmerchantable and have argued for the imposition of warranty liability
 for viruses. In this context, it is somewhat ironic to note that warranty
 liability has generally been disclaimable under the Code whereas the ob-
 ligation to exercise reasonable care has not.97 Although the drafting com-
 mittee has yet to reach consensus on the issues involved,98 the current
 draft imposes a mutual obligation to exercise reasonable care to exclude
 viruses in all electronic performances or messages, but allows that duty to
 be satisfied by language stating that no action was taken to exclude viruses,
 or that a risk exists that viruses have not been excluded, a duty which
 cannot be disclaimed in mass-market transactions.99
 ELECTRONIC REMEDIES AND ELECTRONIC REGULATION
 Advances in technology have made it possible for licensors of infor-
 mation to include in their products codes or devices: (i) which monitor the
 use of the information by the licensee, (ii) prohibit the licensee from unau-
 thorized uses, (iii) discontinue use of the information upon expiration of
 ically asks for software to perform a particular purpose, and in response to that request, the
 licensor furnishes software. Analogizing to the implied warranty of fitness for purposes of
 present section 2-315, Article 2B also would impose an implied warranty in such an instance.
 It is expected that future drafts of Article 2B will treat the two situations in separate provisions.
 96. Article 2B defines a virus to mean "computer instructions intended to disrupt, damage,
 destroy, or interfere with use of a communications facility or a computer without the consent
 or permission of the owner." Id. § 2B-313 (a).
 97. Present section 1-102 specifically provides that while the provisions of the Code are
 generally subject to contrary agreement of the parties, obligations of reasonableness and care
 may not be disclaimed.
 98. At the April 1997 meeting of the drafting committee, a motion to adopt a duty of
 reasonable care with statutory safe harbor was rejected by a vote of four to six; a motion to
 adopt a disclaimable warranty specific to viruses was defeated four to seven; and a motion
 to adopt a duty of care that was non-disclaimable in a mass-market standard form was also
 rejected four to six.
 99. U.C.C. § 2B-313 (May 5, 1997 draft) (electronic viruses).
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 the license term, or (iv) permit discontinuation of use upon default by the
 lessor. These devices, referred to as "software locks," "logic bombs," or
 "drop dead" devices, have been the subject of heated discussion.100
 Article 2B makes an initial distinction between software codes which
 merely limit or restrict the use of the information (thereby preventing
 breach), and those which permit the exercise of remedies upon breach.
 Codes restricting use of the information as provided in the license are
 generally permissible.101 The licensor must take care, however, not to
 deactivate the software in a way that prohibits uses authorized by the
 agreement; such deactivation is more accurately characterized as the ex-
 ercise of a right upon default.
 The issue of electronic remedies upon default is far more controversial.
 Upon default by the licensee, the licensor has rights to self-help under
 Article 2B. Because a licensor retains a substantial interest in the subject
 matter of the license, the licensor has a right to take possession or prevent
 the use of the subject matter of the license not unlike the right of a lessor
 or secured party to repossess under Article 2A or Article 9 respectively.102
 As in Articles 2 A and 9, the right to self-help repossession must be accom-
 plished without any breach of the peace. Article 2B imposes, however,
 additional restrictions on self-help not present in either Articles 2 A or 9.
 These restrictions are significant. They originated out of concern for elec-
 tronic remedies, but are not so limited in their scope. First, there must be
 a breach by the licensee that is material as to the entire contract; technical
 defaults will not suffice. Second, a licensor may not exercise any self-help
 rights if there is a foreseeable risk of injury to person or significant damage
 to or destruction of information or property of the licensee.103 A third
 limitation on electronic repossession or electronic self-help is even more
 restrictive: the license agreement must contain a term authorizing the li-
 censor to include any electronic devices in the licensed information.104
 Moreover, the use of the electronic remedy where there has been no ma-
 100. See Stephen L. Poe & Teresa L. Conover, Pulling the Plug: The Use and Legality of
 Technology-Based Remedies by Vendors in Süßware Contracts, 56 Albany L. Rev. 609 (1993); Esther
 C. Roditti, Is Self-Help a Lawful Contractual Remedy?, 21 Rut. GOMP. & Tech. LJ. 431 (1995).
 101. U.C.C, section 2B-314 (May 5, 1997 draft) provides that such codes are permissible
 if the contract authorizes their use. The proposed Code merely prevents unauthorized uses
 of the information, infringement of intellectual property rights, and the further use of infor-
 mation at the expiration of the term. Reasonable notice is required, however, if the license
 term is for more than 30 days. See also section 2B-628(d) which provides that a party may
 use electronic means to enforce rights on termination for reasons other than expiration of
 lease term as long as the other party is notified.
 102. Id. § 2B-715 (titled, "Right to Possession and to Prevent Use"); id. § 2B-716 (titled,
 "Licensor's Self-Help"); id. § 2A-525; id. § 9-503.
 103. Id. §2B-716(a)(2).
 104. Id. § 2B-716(b). Article 2B presently has optional language concerning this term:
 either there must be manifest assent to the term or the term must be conspicuous.
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 terial breach by the licensee constitutes a breach by the licensor, making
 it liable for any foreseeable loss.105
 CONCLUSION
 The process of adapting the Code to new business practices and tech-
 nologies began as soon as the first official version was released in 1957
 when banks began processing checks with computers, and has continued
 to include electronic trading in securities and wholesale funds transfers.
 The current revisions and proposed additions to the Code and general
 contract law attempt to establish a viable framework for the conduct of
 electronic commerce. Electronic commerce is still commerce, whether
 conducted over closed, proprietary computer networks or open networks,
 such as the Internet. Existing principles of commercial law can and will
 be adapted to meet the new demands of these business practices. Efforts
 now underway within the uniform law drafting process are aimed both at
 keeping the regulation of electronic commerce within the domain of state
 rather than federal legislation, and at creating a law of electronic com-
 merce that is responsive to national and global business developments.
 105. /¿§2B-716(b).
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